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 Advancing Our Approach to 
Global Justice for Children 
 So far, we have outlined a concept of social justice for children in welfare 
states and criticized child poverty within them as unjust. We have argued 
that different agents are responsible for securing justice for these children 
and that the respective extent of their responsibility can be determined, 
at least approximately, using different criteria relating to the capacities 
of these actors and their role in the causation of child poverty, as well 
as their relation to the child and her living condition. The state and its 
institutions – education system, health care, social protection services 
and so on – are obviously the most important agents in this respect: 
as they possess metaresponsibility, they should enforce, if necessary, 
the responsibility of other agents. We have already discussed the inter-
national and global level briefly, acknowledging that it is of importance. 
We have argued, however, that we view the state and its institutions as 
the primary agent in the case of child poverty in modern welfare states – 
they are still strong enough and have plenty of opportunities to shape 
their own institutions and societies. Still, child poverty in welfare states 
is more likely to be alleviated and eradicated if the international and 
global structures within which these states have to act and by which their 
opportunities and institutions are influenced also change. Nevertheless, 
welfare states can do much about child poverty even under the present 
unjust global structure. The situation is different for ‘weaker’ and devel-
oping countries, where child poverty is more widespread and severe. 
These countries have fewer opportunities, and it is very unlikely that 
child poverty in these regions can ever be eradicated without thinking 
about global justice; their problems are simply too closely intertwined 
with imbalances in the current global order. 
 It is clear that in poorer countries child poverty is a much more severe 
and widespread problem than in welfare states, where most poor children 
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reach a level of well-being and well-becoming that is higher than that of 
most children worldwide. Yet one should never use these differences in 
the severity of absolute poverty, so to speak, to underestimate or down-
play the severity of relative poverty; this is certainly not our intention 
in this chapter. Child poverty in welfare states is an injustice that weighs 
heavily and demands coordinated action. An examination of child 
poverty on the global scale, however, shows how it deprives even the 
most fundamental functionings and capabilities, leading to starvation, 
homelessness and death. These forms of deprivation constitute such 
blatant injustices that one can only wonder why it is still allowed to 
exist in a world that has reached such a high technological level. 
 UNICEF (2005) reported that in 2005 every second child in the world 
(1 billion) lived in poverty, that one in three children (640 million) in 
developing countries lived without adequate shelter, that one in five 
children (400 million) had no access to safe water and that one in seven 
children (270 million) had no access to health services. In 2011, close to 
6.9 million children died before their fifth birthday, most of them due 
to a lack of access to nutrition and basic medical care (UNICEF 2012). 
These figures alone give a glimpse of how child poverty in poorer coun-
tries affects many dimensions of the physical, emotional, social and 
economic well-being and well-becoming of children and of how our 
world fails to deliver to these children what they are entitled to as a 
matter of justice. Hence, in this last chapter we wish to at least outline 
how we think our approach extends to these issues. We touch upon two 
aspects of particular importance: first, the task of identifying function-
ings and of setting thresholds that work as a benchmark for criticizing 
global child poverty; and second, the need to prioritize the attribution 
of responsibilities on a global scale. 
 In Chapter 1 we proposed criteria to help identify functionings chil-
dren are entitled to as a matter of justice; we do not see why they should 
not be applicable to any context and to all children in this world. Built 
into these criteria, however, is the claim that the functionings and 
respective thresholds have to be interpreted according to the context 
in which a child lives and that the level of welfare in that country is of 
particular relevance. As we furthermore argued, thresholds of function-
ings as well as capabilities are best interpreted in terms of more specified 
functionings and capabilities. To come back to the earlier example, the 
adequate threshold for the general functioning of being educated can be 
the functioning of going to school for nine years or achieving an educa-
tion that enables one to succeed in the labor market in that society. 
Thresholds are thus specifications of functionings, and it is possible to 
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understand them in terms of a combination of different such specified 
functionings. The threshold of the functioning of being healthy can, 
for instance, be specified using three functionings: (a) living as many 
healthy life years as the average in that society, (b) receiving all vaccines 
medical evidence identifies as beneficial and (c) not being affected by 
more illnesses than others due to arbitrary features that cannot be traced 
back to voluntary choices as an adult or to innate features that cannot 
be altered by medical care without subjecting other persons to other 
injustices. 
 These three functionings refer to important aspects of being healthy, 
but whereas the first and the third directly address the status of being 
healthy, the second one is related to a preventive measure. This points 
to another important issue; namely, that the thresholds of functionings 
are often to be translated into functionings that affect the achievement 
of the respective functioning. The chosen threshold is, then, only an 
indirect specification. We have largely ignored such problems in the 
selection of concrete functionings and their thresholds; instead, we used 
a ‘negative’ approach to criticize the injustice of poverty by looking at 
what it does to the poor children compared with their nonpoor peers who 
live in the same country. We have not judged the effects of child poverty 
on education by using a particular threshold, but we examined how well 
children in poverty fare in the education system and what educational 
achievements they have compared with those of nonpoor school chil-
dren. It can be criticized that this strategy to disclose injustices gives an 
inaccurate evaluation because it is possible that all children in a certain 
society are below the threshold for the functioning of education and 
that looking at the inequalities produced by child poverty does not give 
a clear picture of the problem. We are aware of that; unfortunately, we 
could not come up with a better answer than to say that for the context 
we are interested in – namely, modern welfare states – we assume that 
the majority of children are above the threshold and that looking at the 
inequality and disadvantage produced by poverty is what counts under 
such advanced circumstances. If one uses the threshold of going to 
school for six or nine years, nearly all children in modern welfare states 
reach this threshold, but as we made clear, there still exist injustices in 
education – a deprivation in the functioning to be educated – that are 
related to the socioeconomic position of the child. Furthermore, we did 
not tackle the question of whether comparative weighting of different 
functionings is reasonable and feasible, even necessary in some circum-
stances, but assumed that at least the four functionings examined in 
more detail are highly important – but are they equally important? 
Advancing Our Approach to Global Justice for Children 165
 For an expansion of our approach to cover global child poverty, 
these issues become even more problematic, since a sufficient answer 
for welfare states – to look at relative poverty and the disadvantages it 
produces – is surely not enough for developing countries. It could be 
argued that there is a much more urgent need to prioritize certain func-
tionings in poorer countries – for example, health and nutrition – and 
to give them more weight than, say, education. Such a prioritization 
should not be understood as devaluing education. Poverty alleviation 
relies on improving education and also empowering poor people to 
become agents of justice; the role of education is crucial. Furthermore, 
as was argued in some detail, education can be seen as a fertile func-
tioning, influencing many other aspects of a person’s life and the lives 
of whole communities. Still, without having one’s nutrition and basic 
health secured, education’s value is usually marginal; thus there is good 
reason to secure first what is essential for survival and only then secure 
other functionings and capabilities. This reasoning has strong parallels 
to Henry Shue’s arguments for a basic right to subsistence:
 No one can fully, if at all, enjoy any right that is supposedly protected 
by society if he or she lacks the essentials for a reasonably healthy 
and active life. Deficiencies in the means of subsistence can be just 
as fatal, incapacitating, or painful as violations of physical security. 
The resulting damage or death can at least as decisively prevent the 
enjoyment of any right as can the effects of security violations. (Shue 
1996, 24) 
 On the global level, using such absolute thresholds and specifying func-
tionings that define them is necessary. This is a very tricky task, and 
poverty research is limited in what functionings it can use as well, since 
some are easier to measure and to survey than others. In some cases, the 
functionings used to measure poverty are the result of the data available. 
Sabina Alkire, a pioneer in the application of the capability approach 
in global poverty measurement, used the following six indicators to 
measure child poverty in Bangladesh (Alkire and Roche 2012):
 Nutrition. Children who are more than two standard deviations (1) 
below the international reference population for stunting (height 
for age) or wasting (weight for height) or are underweight (weight 
for age). The standardization follows the algorithms provided by 
WHO’s Child Growth Reference Study. 
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 Water. Children who use water from an unapproved source, such as (2) 
open wells or springs, or use surface water (time to reach the water 
source is not included because this information was not available for 
the Bangladesh Demographic and Health Survey 1997). 
 Sanitation. Children who use an unapproved sanitation facility, (3) 
such as a pit latrine without slab, open pit latrine, bucket toilet or a 
hanging toilet. 
 Health. Children who have not been immunized by age two. (4) 
Children are deprived if they do not receive at least eight of the nine 
vaccinations – bcg, dpt1, dpt2, dpt3, polio0, polio1, polio2, polio3, 
measles – or do not receive treatment for an illness involving an 
acute respiratory infection or diarrhea. 
 Shelter. Children who live in a house with no flooring (i.e., a mud or (5) 
dung floor) or inadequate roofing (overcrowding was not taken into 
account because the Bangladesh Demographic and Health Survey 
1997 does not register the number of rooms used for sleeping). 
 Information. Children with no access to a radio or television (i.e., (6) 
broadcast media). This indicator applies only to children above age 
three. 
 Alkire herself is well aware that this selection reflects just a few dimen-
sions of child poverty and that other important information is missing, 
but these pragmatic choices can be justified in empirical research –having 
some knowledge of a few functionings is always better than having 
none. For a concept of global justice, this is certainly not enough. 
Unfortunately, philosophers have seldom engaged with this task in 
such a way that they came up with functionings or capabilities that can 
really be measured. Nussbaum and others do write about the problem 
but do not provide us with many answers; it is unclear what the exact 
thresholds for capabilities on Nussbaum’s list are, for being healthy, for 
example, or being able to use one’s senses. Not long ago, Ingrid Robeyns 
called the capability approach radically underspecified (Robeyns 2006), 
a critique that is still valid. For children, developing beings that change 
significantly over a rather short period of time, these problems are even 
more compelling, and issues of poverty dynamics and evolving func-
tionings and capabilities are more relevant. We do not aim to come up 
with a definite list of functionings and respective thresholds for these 
functionings in terms of specified measurable functionings either. What 
is important, though, is to tackle the problem of differences between 
contexts. The functionings described above and used by Alkire in the 
context of Bangladesh show that over 90 percent of children live in a 
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house with no flooring or inadequate roofing, and the deprivation rates 
for nutrition, sanitation and information (access to broadcast media) are 
nearly 60 percent. These numbers speak for themselves and make the 
injustice of child poverty in Bangladesh and other developing countries 
clearly visible. But in regard to the nature and effects of child poverty 
in modern welfare states, these functionings provide us with barely 
any information at all. Still, there is poverty, and in the course of this 
book we have presented some of its moral implications. The fact that 
it cannot be measured using the functionings employed by Alkire in 
Bangladesh must not lead to the conclusion that the living conditions 
of the respective children are free from any problems. 
 Against this background, where should the thresholds be set? In which 
functionings should they be specified? There is a real danger in setting 
them either too low or too high. We see two different basic strategies 
for handling the questions, though with important variances. The first 
is to differentiate between countries and allow them to set their own 
thresholds, at least within reasonable limits. This approach is favored 
by Nussbaum and also by Sen, who has a far more pragmatic approach 
and leaves the selection of the relevant functionings and capabilities up 
to the respective nations or societies. Nussbaum has made her approach 
clear on numerous occasions: 
 Setting the threshold precisely is a matter for each nation, and, within 
certain limits, it is reasonable for nations to do this differently, in 
keeping with their history and traditions. (Nussbaum 2011, 41) 
 Indeed, part of the idea of the list is its  multiple realizability : its members 
can be more concretely specified in accordance with local beliefs and 
circumstances. It is thus designed to leave room for a reasonable 
pluralism in specification. The threshold level of each of the central 
capabilities will need more precise determination, as citizens work 
toward a consensus for political purposes. This can be envisaged as 
taking place within each constitutional tradition, as it evolves through 
interpretation and deliberation. (Nussbaum 2000, 77) 
 There are at least two problems with this solution, of which Nussbaum 
and others are well aware; still, no one has come up with a sufficient 
answer so far. On the one hand, this differentiating approach produces 
results that seem to contradict the aim of a concept of justice; namely, to 
provide all children with sufficient functionings that they need for their 
well-being and well-becoming. Again, we use the example of education. 
Mario Biggeri and his colleagues researched child poverty in Afghanistan 
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and used the percentage of primary-school-age children who are not 
enrolled in school to measure educational functioning (Biggeri, Trani 
and Mauro 2010). Interpreting this in normative terms in a concept 
of justice, we say that every child of primary school age is entitled to 
go to school. For a child in a welfare state like Germany or the United 
Kingdom, the threshold would be different due to the fact that nearly 
all children of that age are enrolled, making it much more reasonable 
to take completion of secondary education as a minimum standard. In 
the language of justice, each and every child in Germany is entitled, 
as a matter of justice, to finish secondary education because this is the 
basic threshold for the functioning of education. If one uses these two 
different thresholds, a puzzling and disturbing result is that a child who 
does not finish secondary education in Germany is evaluated as being 
wronged, while a child in Afghanistan in the same circumstances is not. 
This seems questionable, as these two children are different in no feature 
save the arbitrary one of birthplace. It would be unjust in itself, so it 
appears, to tolerate exactly the same deprivation for one child and criti-
cize it for the other. Is the child living in Afghanistan not entitled to 
the same level of functioning in education as the child in Germany? Is 
she of unequal worth? Does she not have the same entitlement to well-
being and well-becoming? 
 On the other hand, Nussbaum and others claim that for some func-
tionings or capabilities, the threshold should be universal and in some 
even strictly egalitarian in the sense that every human is entitled to 
the same. An example for adults would be voting rights, which should 
be, according to Nussbaum, distributed equally; it would be unjust if a 
society decides to let only men vote or to let them vote for their house-
hold. An example for children would probably be the functioning to 
live free of exploitation (which is on the list of Biggeri); it seems reason-
able and necessary to claim that each and every child, no matter in 
which society, is entitled to being equally free of exploitation, with all 
the relevant protections in place. The question then arises: what func-
tionings and capabilities (of children) should be universal, and what 
thresholds should be used? Furthermore, it is not obvious who should 
be able give answers to these questions, and, again, the issue of power 
arises forcefully. 
 We believe that these difficulties give us enough reasons to dismiss 
this strategy and be in favor of the second one, which sets universal 
thresholds for all children wherever they live. This implies that the 
threshold children are entitled to reach in a specific functioning is the 
same in Austria, the USA, Bangladesh, India and South Africa. As we said 
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in regard to some functionings, this is also claimed by proponents of 
the first strategy. We gave as examples voting rights and freedom from 
exploitations, where any differentiations between different members of 
society are clearly always wrong. But we go a step further and demand 
this feature for each and every functioning that matters for justice. 
 The crucial question, then, is how to set such universal thresholds, 
which should neither be too high, so that they cannot be reached by 
most countries, nor too low, so that many forms of injustices cannot be 
detected and criticized. We agree that solving this problem cannot be 
done by relying on philosophical reasoning alone and that empirical 
knowledge that goes beyond the scope of what we are able to provide 
here is needed. Nonetheless, we believe that a concept of global justice 
still has to come up with some answer that goes beyond simply handing 
over the problem to the social sciences or politicians. 
 Our solution is to claim that the threshold for each functioning (or 
capability, if it comes to older children) should be set at a level as high as 
it is already for the majority of children in welfare states. Let us explain 
this solution in more detail: the first assumption is that today’s world 
is highly unjust and that children across the globe are hindered from 
developing and sustaining high levels in all important functionings. 
They die too young, they suffer from preventable diseases and they lack 
sufficient education as well as inclusion and political participation. We 
assume that this world could do a much better job and that its polit-
ical, cultural, social and economic institutions could be designed and 
implemented in a much better way, reducing or even setting aside the 
inequalities between children – and between the countries they live in. 
We assume that all children in this world could reach the level of func-
tioning reached by a majority of children in modern welfare states if the 
world just looked different. This is one main reason that we propose a 
universal threshold – it gives a clear picture of a world in which it is not 
enough that children in poorer countries are a little bit healthier than 
they are today, get a little more education and are a little less likely to be 
deprived of shelter, food and clean water. Doubtless, such a world would 
already constitute an improvement, but it is not one we should aspire 
to. The goal must be to improve the well-being and well-becoming of 
all children to a level that some children worldwide – and a majority of 
children in welfare states – enjoy today, simply because we can do it. We 
know that this account is connected to a very high level of sufficiency, 
one that is not even realized for all children in modern welfare states, 
but everything else seems too low. We do not strive for perfection with 
these thresholds either, and it should be clear enough that the level of 
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well-being and well-becoming that the majority of children in welfare 
states enjoy (the best indication for a just threshold, in our view) are 
still far away from a maximum. In the first chapter, we have already 
dismissed a maximizing view in well-being and well-becoming for two 
reasons: first, it is too demanding on the side of those who are respon-
sible for securing it for children, and second, it is highly unclear how 
such a maximum could be defined in the first place. Our threshold, 
instead, takes up a more realistic stance concerning what should be 
achieved; that it is already achieved for many children in many coun-
tries also counters the objection that such high thresholds are not feas-
ible. If a few countries can do it, why should the whole world not be able 
to set up a much more inclusive welfare system, with social protection, 
education, health care and so on? Still, our approach leaves a lot of room 
for differentiation and different ways to realize justice for children. Here 
it is important not to mix thresholds of functionings with the conver-
sion factors to achieve them. A threshold can, according to our account, 
take the form of enabling each and every child a comprehensive educa-
tion that prepares them with the necessary skills and competencies to 
become active members of society, to make informed decisions and to 
be aware of the equal worth of all humans. This threshold has to be set 
in accordance with the levels of well-being and well-becoming currently 
achieved in modern welfare states and is, in this sense, not relative. It is 
oriented toward what is reasonably achievable and goes beyond typical 
capability theorists’ rather relativist approaches. It is important to note, 
however, that we are dealing here with a threshold in terms of specified 
functionings – and so we argue for a universalist account (one adaptable 
through time and in general circumstances on a global level, though). 
 But the conversion factors to achieve this threshold can be very 
different. They can refer, for example, to a public school system that 
limits the role of private schools or to an active role by organizations 
and the early inclusion of children and adolescents in regional decision-
making processes. Modern welfare states today show a wide range of 
such conversion factors, and it is often not clear which yields better 
results; it seems that there are always trade-offs to be considered and 
that a conversion factor that is highly beneficial to achieve one func-
tioning has a slightly negative effect on a different functioning or that 
two conversion factors can come into conflict with each other. There is 
plenty of room for each society and state to design its own institutions. 
Such a universal threshold is also in line with what we did over the 
course of this book in regard to child poverty in welfare states and highly 
developed societies. Even within them, children in poverty fall short in 
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comparison with their nonpoor peers and are contingently disadvan-
taged in many dimensions. These societies would be much more just if 
they enabled all children living within them to reach what is reached for 
the majority of children who are not poor. 
 The second question that seems crucial for a concept of global justice 
for children concerns attributing responsibilities. We have proposed a first 
systematization for children in welfare states, and the main difference to 
this in respect to global child poverty is probably the responsibility we 
can lay upon poor states and their institutions. Poorer countries, where 
child poverty is most severe and widespread, are much weaker than in 
the USA and European welfare states. These states have far less power 
and fewer opportunities to counteract child poverty in their countries, 
to secure justice for these children and allow them to achieve a sufficient 
level in each important functioning (Babb 2009; Williamson 2011). 
Most theorists of global justice acknowledge this inequality between 
states, especially the international political and economic order’s role in 
producing and reproducing these inequalities, keeping poorer countries 
from developing and from building stronger social protection systems 
and achieving a higher level of welfare for their citizens. 
 Poor countries need trade for development. They do not get fair 
trading opportunities under the WTO regime; but one that failed 
to sign up would find its trading opportunities even more severely 
curtailed. Any poor country is forced to decide about whether to sign 
up to the WTO rules against the background of other rules that it 
cannot escape and that make it extremely costly not to sign up. One 
such rule is, for instance, that the people and firms of poor coun-
tries may not freely offer their products and services to people in 
rich countries. This rule enables the rich countries to exact a price for 
whatever limited access to their markets they are prepared to grant. 
Part of this price is that the intellectual property rights of rich-country 
corporations must be respected and enforced. Poor-country govern-
ments must help collect rents for those corporations, thereby driving 
up the cost of pharmaceuticals and foodstuffs for their own popula-
tions. Paying this price makes sense perhaps for poor countries, given 
their calamitous circumstances. But this calamity is due to a rule that 
the rich countries impose unilaterally, without any consent by the 
poor. (Pogge 2007, 43) 
 This leads us to conclude that the responsibilities of the agents of justice 
in regard to global child poverty should be weighted differently and that 
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the agents on the international and global level have a much higher 
responsibility, while the states high up on the list when it comes to child 
poverty in welfare states move down. They are to a substantial extent 
the victims of injustices themselves and have only limited options to 
move their citizens, adults as well as children, out of poverty. Still, these 
states share some responsibility and are obliged to do what is in their 
power to secure justice for children living in their societies and to adapt 
their cultural, social, political and economic institutions in such a way 
that they provide the necessary conversion factors to let all children 
achieve a just threshold in each important functioning. Poor states are 
partially responsible for their own situation, and justice demands that 
they try to alter and enhance their capacities to change. This also applies 
to the people living in these states. We see here an analogy between poor 
states and poor parents: even if they have responsibilities of justice, as 
David Miller (2007) argues, for example, as soon as they are not able to 
fulfill them adequately, a different agent of justice, in this case richer 
and more powerful states, has to substitute. It would be unjust to hold 
poor states responsible for the costs of children’s suffering, because they 
cannot be said to be responsible. 
 Furthermore, in the global context, some of our endorsed consider-
ations on the sufficiency principle gain additional force (see Chapter 1). 
We urged an interpretation of the sufficiency principle combining a 
demand-side view with a supply-side view, claiming that those in privi-
leged positions must give sufficient attention to inequalities in the 
distribution of functionings and capabilities. The meaning of ‘sufficient 
attention’ however, depends in large part on how urgent the needs of 
the ‘demand side’ are; that is, the people who are suffering. In addition, 
we presented a priority view consisting of three elements for tackling 
functionings. It asks how important a functioning is, how severe and 
widespread its deprivation, and what is needed to overcome the depriv-
ation in this dimension. From these considerations it follows that alle-
viation of global child poverty is even more urgent than alleviation of 
child poverty in welfare states. Again, this diagnosis must not lead to 
the conclusion that relative child poverty is nothing to worry about. It 
is evident that global poverty (a) jeopardizes even children’s most basic 
functionings (in fact it often leads to death), (b) exists to an extremely 
high degree and (c) can be alleviated considerably by relatively small 
changes to the global order. It therefore triggers strong claims of respon-
sibilities on the supply side. 
 This brings us to a further group of agents that are assumed to have 
different kinds of responsibilities for global child poverty in respect to 
Advancing Our Approach to Global Justice for Children 173
child poverty in welfare states: other persons in the global community of 
humans. We gave these agents of justice a rather low ranking in regard to 
child poverty in welfare states because most members have only limited 
capacities to change something and have only limited responsibility for 
the existence of child poverty. We took into account that the majority 
of agents in this global community are themselves poor or have a low 
status of well-being because they live in poorer countries. This is still 
true in the case of global child poverty, but nonetheless, many agents in 
the global community, people who live in welfare states, who are there-
fore much richer and have much more resources, can make a real diffe-
rence. If a middle-class adult in a welfare state adopts a poor child from 
another welfare state, this child’s situation will probably improve; this 
improvement, however, has to be weighed against possible harms; for 
example, when a child is removed from her biological parents and has 
to move to another country or the burden that is put upon the parent-
to-be. In the case of global child poverty, our skepticism regarding a 
responsibility that can be translated into a duty to adopt poor children 
without sufficient means seems less reasonable. Daniel Friedrich has 
recently defended such a duty to adopt (Friedrich 2013); as applied to 
the case of child poverty, it is true that moving a child likely to die 
or suffer severely over her whole life in her home country – perhaps 
even against her will and the will of her parents – to a middle-class 
parent or family in a welfare state would certainly improve her condi-
tion to such an extent that our counterarguments become less valid. 
This implies that there might indeed be such a duty to adopt, maybe 
with some caveats; for example, that this duty apply only to those who 
wish to have children in the first place or only as long as child poverty 
is as severe as it is now. 
 We note again that a concept of global justice for children should 
also make use of an ecological approach, such as the one proposed, and 
differentiate between different agents and their responsibilities. This 
implies giving the poor themselves and poor children, as they reach a 
certain level of competencies and maturity, a role in the alleviation of 
poverty and in the design and implementation of measures of justice 
(Deveaux 2013). Reasons for doing so are not limited to the fact that the 
poor have a right to be heard and included in decisions affecting them; 
there are also pragmatic reasons built on the knowledge that measures 
that take the poor seriously and are developed on the basis of real know-
ledge about them and their situation work better. Besides, taking the 
agency of the poor seriously is empowering (Drydyk 2013). This aspect 
of participation and empowerment of poor people is both relevant for 
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global (child) poverty as it is for (child) poverty as it typically occurs in 
welfare states. In both contexts the poverty knowledge of poor people 
and their interest in overcoming their poverty and their children’s give 
them, as we argued in Chapter 3, certain responsibilities, albeit limited 
ones, for action against child poverty. However, there is a relevant diffe-
rence to be noted, too. The severe poverty of the global poor and their 
typically very limited scope of action leads to the conclusion that they 
have almost no responsibility toward poor children living in welfare 
states. On the contrary, it makes sense to assert that poor people in 
welfare states have certain responsibilities toward poor children in devel-
oping countries or failed states. They profit, albeit to a smaller degree 
than many of their fellow countrymen, from an unjust global order and 
often they contribute with their consumption, at least to some degree, 
to the upholding of structural injustices on a global level. It therefore 
makes sense to think about their relationship to poor children on a 
global level in terms of responsibilities and to call upon them to rethink 
their actions and behaviors in some aspects, as is generally done for 
members of affluent states. Naturally, the kinds and weights of responsi-
bilities of agents within these societies differ; application of the grounds 
for attributing responsibilities that we identified in Chapter 3 will lead 
to the conclusion that generally the responsibilities of poor people in 
affluent societies toward the global poor are low compared with those of 
their rich and powerful fellow countrymen. However, they should not 
be completely ignored. 
 4.1 Conclusions 
 In this section, we have given some ideas how our critical theory of 
child poverty, which we developed first and foremost for modern welfare 
states in affluent societies, can be extended to the global level. We have 
defended the view that it is important to aim for relatively high thresh-
olds in the most important functionings (and capabilities, if applicable) 
for children, independent from where they happen to be born. The 
basic commitment of the capability approach to show equal concern 
and respect for every human being points, in our interpretation, clearly 
toward this goal. It does not seem fair to apply different standards for 
well-being and well-becoming based on completely arbitrary features, 
and a reasonable point of reference seems to be provided by what has 
been already achieved for most children in welfare states. We are aware 
that this goal is, in practice, hard to achieve and often changes and 
that improvements have to be implemented pragmatically and in small 
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steps. Still, a normative concept of justice should also open up horizons 
that are worth aspiring to. For this, it is not necessary to develop a tran-
scendental theory of justice that tries to fully specify the concept in all 
details (Sen 2009). It is enough to work with the realistic and rather 
simple conception of justice we have developed in this book. 
 We acknowledge that what we have discussed here about a global 
concept of justice for children is just preliminary and is insufficient 
in many aspects. Capability theorists need to do more work to specify 
the functionings and capabilities children are entitled to and how the 
thresholds for each of them should be set. Our solution needs to be 
scrutinized in more detail to be proven a viable alternative to the most 
common strategy of using different thresholds in different nations, 
which we dismissed. Our examination of the attribution of responsibil-
ities to different agents of justice is also just a first dip into a much wider 
issue. Nonetheless, we have argued that such an expansion of justice 
from the domestic to the global level is needed and that this demands 
aiming high and not being satisfied with making the lives of children in 
poverty just a little less harmful and deprived but making real progress. 
The fact that hundreds of millions of children are born into circum-
stances where even the most basic goods are missing and where it is 
just not possible for them to have a minimally decent life is surely not 
their fault and can never justify claiming less for them than what we 
claim for children who had the luck to be born in a welfare state. As 
a matter of justice, each and every child matters the same and has the 
same entitlements. 
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